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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to make an example which, first, illustrates
Starret’s Spatial Imposibility Theorem, when agents have free mobility; and
second, allowes us to get a competitive equilibrium with transportation when
agents move only if there is a noticeable difference in utilities that justifies
the change of location.
1 Introduction
This is a paper on General Equilibrium that makes explicit considerations of the
agent’s decision on where to be located.
In the last decade the work of M. Fujita, P. Krugmann, F. Thisse and many
other authors has called the attention of theoretical economists about the study of
location patterns that can arise as equilibria. More than forty years ago there also
was a vivid interest on this subject as the work of Koopmans and Beckmann among
others show. The example we present here has been constructed basically as an
intent to understand an impossibility result stated by Starret (1978) and presented
in Fujita and Thisse (2001), and to see what kind of changes in the economy can
turn this into a possibility result.
The location, together with the physical characteristic of the good and its tem-
poral dimension is, in the Arrow-Debreu set up, one of the distinctive features that
are needed to identify the good. Therefore, it can be said that location has been
taken into account on all abstract general equilibrium models. Nevertheless, most
of those general equilibrium models only mention the location issue when defin-
ing the goods. Typically they do not need any special reference to a production
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activity devoted only to change good’s location and nothing is said about where
consumers and firms are located. General equilibrium models are basically space-
less. The recent work of Fujita, Krugmann and Thisse, among others, is devoted,
on the contrary, to the study of the “Geography” that can turn out as consequence
of economic decisions. The models those authors construct are also “General Equi-
librium Models” because nothing is taken from outside, every variable needs to be
explained and all economic interactions are important to determine the resulting
equilibria. What it is important for us now, is that all those models explicitly reject
the price taking behavior hypothesis. Thisse and Fujita (2001) argue that a non-
competitive General Equilibrium approach is one of the three alternatives available
(the others being the introduction of heterogeneous space and the study of external-
ities in production and consumption) for the study of spatial distribution, because
of the “unsuspected” result established in Starret (1978) that they entitle Spatial
Impossibility Theorem. They enunciate this theorem as
[Starret’s] Spatial Impossibility Theorem: Consider an economy with a finite
number of agents and locations. If space is homogeneous, transport is costly and
preferences are locally nonsatiated, then there is no competitive equilibrium in-
volving transportation.
The free mobility assumption explicitly mentioned by Starret is included in the
definition of homogeneous space that basically requires that “consumer and pro-
ducers have no intrinsic preferences for one location over the others” In his work
Starret is “interested in analyzing how well the market handles the locational deci-
sions in situations were people are reasonably free to move around if they see an
economic incentive to do so”. This question was already possed and answered in
Koopmans and Beckmann (1957) and Starret presents his result as a generalization
of what Koopmans and Beckmann call the quadratic assignment problem where
N firms have to be allocated in N places in order to maximize the total production
net of transportation costs. Koopmans and Beckmann’s result could be stated as
concluding “Our main point here is that these direct physical interactions between
production and/or consumption processes are by no means the only reasons for
such a failure of the price system. The mere fact that scarce resources need to be
utilized for the transportation of intermediate commodities between plans appears
to be sufficient to deprive the price system of its ability to induce efficient decen-
tralized allocative decisions”. In order to stablish his result Starret does not need
economic agents to be maximizers, his result “we have shown that under a wide
set of cicumstances,(any) market configuration of prices must offer an economic
incentive to move for some agents” is based on the analysis of profits and incomes
of the firms and consumers and is well aware that those “move incentives (...) can
be nullified by either fixed costs of moving or by perceived market power”.
When, at the Universidad Pu´blica de Navarra, we started working on location
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economics we were not aware of those powerful results. We adopted the non-
competitive approach because we simply understood it was descriptively more ac-
curate than the competitive one.
Now, the basic reason of our interest in a competitive general equilibrium
model is that we still do not completely understand the reasons of the failure of the
competitive mechanism in this particular set up. Certainly it seems that the exist-
ing externalities because “scarce resources need to be utilized for the transportation
of intermediate commodities between plans” are the reason of the failure detected
by Koopmans, Beckmann and Starret. But those externalities are also present in
the simple model Mills (1970) constructed and yet he finds that the competitive
mechanism yields a Pareto Optimum allocation when he dispenses with all the in-
divisibilities of the quadratic assignment problem as formulated by Koopmans and
Beckmann. Probably the location issue is, after all, an issue where indivisibilities
are unavoidable. In this work we will not be dealing with the Pareto Optimality of
the competitive allocation, we just want to see if an allocation involving transporta-
tion where agents are price takers is possible. In our work it has been very helpful
the work by Ellickson and Zame (1994) and our example is depends heavily on
their construction.
2 Our example
As it has been just said our example is in the same spirit as the examples con-
structed in Ellickson and Zame (1994).
We will consider an economy with only two sites (1 and 2), three commodities,
(land, labor and a consumption commodity) and a continuum of agents. There will
be two types of consumers: a fraction Θ are workers endowed with ¯h units of time
that can be devoted to leisure or to work, and a fraction 1  Θ are landowners that
in addition to the endowment of time, have ¯l1 units of land at site 1 and ¯l2 units of
land at site 2. Both types have the same utility function.
In this economy there are two productive sectors: in both sites there is the
possibility of producing consumption commodity using land and labor as factors
and there is also a transportation sector.
Our example illustrates Starret’s theorem quite clearly because when free mo-
bility is assumed then the only competitive equilibrium is an equilibrium with no
transportation, regardless of the initial endowments at both sites. This, in our opin-
ion, is an indication of how powerful this theorem is.
The main change we have made with respect to Ellickson and Zame is the
introduction of an explicit transportation sector instead of the adoption of Samuel-
son’s iceberg cost to capture that transportation is not free. We have introduced this
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transportation sector in order to be able to make straightforward comparisons with
Starret’s results.
We have also dispensed with free mobility assumption, explicitly considering
some mobility costs as in Ellickson and Zame. Our way of modeling this cost is
formally a special case of they way of modeling it. In our model a move from
one place to another is only worthwhile when the improvement is noticeable. With
free mobility, an equilibrium where identical people are located in different sites
requires that the utilities attained in all those different sites are equal. In our ex-
ample a noticeable difference is required for an agent to move. Formally, it is as
if each agent had different preferences in the different places, this is clearly a case
explicitly ignored in Starret (1978) and a special case in Ellickson and Zame.
The preferences of both workers and landowners are of the form
Uhi, li, yi  hiliyi
where hi is the amount of time devoted to leisure by consumer i, l i is the amount of
land used by this consumer, and yi the amount of consumption good.
We will say that a consumer is in location j, j  1, 2	, when he uses land in j.
When a consumer is in location j, he consumes yij , i.e. the consumer has positive
utility only if land, leisure and consumption commodity are being used at the same
location.
In both sites it is possible to pruce comsumption good. The relation between
inputs and output takes also the form of a very simple Cobb–Douglas function
yi  hiy1/2liy1/2 i  1, 2	
We assume that the transportation of one unit of consumption good requires
only Α units of labor. If p1 is the price of the consumption good at 1 and p 2 is the
price of the consumption good at 2, the existence of a price taker transportation
sector requires p2  p1  Αw1 if the good is taken from location 1 to 2, and p 1 
p2  Αw2 if the transported good goes from 2 to 1. This is a fundamental relation
that has to be maintained in all competitive equilibria with transportation. With no
loss of generality we will describe equilibria where the commodity is transported
from 1 to 2.
A competitive equilibria with free mobility is a vector of prices w 1, r1, p1,
w2, r2, p2, an allocation h
i
1, li1, yi1, hi2, li2, yi2 for all consumers i and a distribution
of workers and landowners between the to sites Μ, Γ (where Μ is the proportion
of workers in site 1, and Γ the proportion of land owners in 1) that satisfy the
following conditions:
p1  2

r1w1 (1)
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p2  2

r2w2 (2)
p2  p1  Αw1 (3)
1  Θ¯l1 

w1
r1
y1  Γ1  Θ
¯l1r1  ¯l2r2  ¯hw1
3r1
 ΜΘ
¯hw1
3r1
(4)
being y1 the total production in location 1.
1  Θ¯l2 

w2
r2
y2  1  Γ1 Θ
¯l1r1  ¯l2r2  ¯hw2
3r2
 1  ΜΘ
¯hw2
3r2
(5)
being y2 the total production in location 2.
y1  X  Γ1  Θ
¯l1r1  ¯l2r2  ¯hw1
3p1
 ΜΘ
¯hw1
3p1
(6)
where X is the amount exported from site 1 to 2.
X  y2  1  Γ1  Θ
¯l1r1  ¯l2r2  ¯hw2
3p2
 1  ΜΘ
¯hw2
3p2
(7)
Γ1  Θ  ΜΘ ¯h 

r1
w1
y1  ΑX  Γ1  Θ
¯l1r1  ¯l2r2  ¯hw1
3w1
 ΜΘ
¯h
3 (8)
1Γ1Θ1ΜΘ ¯h 

r2
w2
y21Γ1Θ
¯l1r1  ¯l2r2  ¯hw2
3w2
1ΜΘ
¯h
3 (9)
Equations (4) and (5) reflect the equality between supply and demand of land
in each of the locations, equations (6) and (7) equalize supply and demand of the
consumption, and equations (8) and (9) are equilibria condition for labor. Since
for the economy as a whole Walras Law holds, only 5 of this last 6 equations are
independent.
In order to capture Starret’s result, under free mobility it is also required that, in
an equilibrium, the utility of workers, and the utility of landowners at both locations
be identical, that is:
w1 ¯h3r1   ¯h3 w1 ¯h3p1   w2 ¯h3r2   ¯h3 w2 ¯h3p2  (10)
¯l1r1  ¯l2r2  ¯hw13
27r1w1 p1

¯l1r1  ¯l2r2  ¯hw23
27r2w2 p2
(11)
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2.1 Ilustration of Starret’s Theorem
In this section, we are going to demonstrate that the Starret’s Theorem is truth in
our example and in one extension of it.
2.1.1 Initial Model
In our model it is easy to see how strong Starret’s Theorem is. As said before
Starret’s result does not deal explicitly with a competitive allocation, his result is
valid for any price-taking configuration. In his proof, though, he assumes that all
locations have the same endowment of land. In our illustration, we can dispense
with this assumption if we focus only in the competitive allocation.
It is easy to verify that equations (10) and (11), with equations (1) and (2)
imply that in equilibrium all prices must be equal between both sites, and that is
incompatible with equation (3), namely, with transport activity.
In the examples we have used, for simplicity reasons, ¯h  ¯l1  ¯l2  1, but the
result is general.
We start by normalizing prices to w1  1. With this normalization and equa-
tions (1) and (2), expression (10) gives us
w
2
1 ¯h3
27r1p1

w
2
2 ¯h3
27r2p2

1
r
3/2
1

w
3/2
2
r
3/2
2
and then
1
r1

w2
r2
(12)
By the same way, from equation (11)
¯h  r1¯l1  r2¯l23
r
3/2
1

w2 ¯h  r1¯l1  r2¯l23
r
3/2
2 w
3/2
2
or
¯h  r1¯l1  r2¯l2
r
1/2
1

w2 ¯h  r1¯l1  r2¯l2
r
1/2
2 w
1/2
2
Using (12) permit us to have
r
1/2
1 ¯l1 
r2¯l2
r
1/2
1

r1¯l1
r
1/2
1 w
1/2
2

r
1/2
2 ¯l2
w
1/2
2
If we divide by r1/21 we have
¯l1 
r2¯l2
r1

r
1/2
1 ¯l1
r
1/2
1 w
1/2
2

r
1/2
2 ¯l2
r
1/2
1 w
1/2
2
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and using (12) once more
¯l1  w2¯l2 
¯l1
w2
 ¯l2
Now it is easy to see that
w2¯l1  w2¯l2  ¯l1  w2¯l2  w2  1
But if w2  1, then by (12) we have r1  r2, and by (1) and (2), p1  p2,
which is a contradiction with (3). Then, it is not possible to satisfy (1)-(11), just as
Starret’s Theorem says.
An equilibrium with transport is not possible with free mobility if transport
cost exists Α  0.
2.1.2 Model with intermediate product
In this part we are going to extend the previous framework supposing that we have
got an intermediate product which can be produced in any region, or in both of
them. Suppose that the production function has changed in the following form
yi  hiy1/2miy1/2 i  1, 2	
where the new factor miy represents an intermediate product, which is mobile be-
tween both regions. In order to produce one unit of m iy, we need, only, the land
factor. For simplicity we have considered that the intermediate product’s produc-
tion function is :
mi  Βli i  1, 2	
The principal difference between this model and the last one, is that in this model
the two production factors of yi are mobile. Also, to transportate one unit of miy
we need incurre in a transport cost of Α. Because of this, we are capable to find
some differences in the previous equations. Notice that in this framework, the price
equations have changed in the following form
p1  2

pm1w1 (13)
p2  2

pm2w2 (14)
pm2  pm1  Α (15)
We can demonstrate that
pm1  Βr1 (16)
pm2  Βr2 (17)
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Now, in the same sense of the previous section, the equations (13) and (14),
with the expression (10) gives us
w
2
1 ¯h3
54r3/21 Β1/2w1/21

w
2
2 ¯h3
54r3/22 Β1/2w1/22

w
1/2
1
r
1/2
1

w
1/2
2
r
1/2
2
and then, by normalizaing prices to w1  1, is easy to see that
1
r1

w2
r2
(18)
is the same that the (12).
By the same way, from equation (11)
¯h  r1¯l1  r2¯l23
Β1/2r21

w2 ¯h  r1¯l1  r2¯l23
r
2
2w2Β1/2
or
¯h  r1¯l1  r2¯l2
r
2/3
1 Β1/6

w2 ¯h  r1¯l1  r2¯l2
r
2/3
2 w
1/3
2 Β1/6
Then we are able to rewrite this equation as
¯h  r1¯l1  r2¯l23
r
2/3
1

w2 ¯h  r1¯l1  r2¯l23
r
2/3
2 w
1/3
2
Using (18), and a little computation, permit us to have
¯h  r1¯l1  r2¯l2 
w2 ¯h  r1¯l1  r2¯l2
w2
Now it is easy to see that
w2r1¯l1  r2¯l2  r1¯l1  r2¯l2  w2  1
Then, if w2  1 we can see by (18) that we have got r1  r2, by (16) and (17),
we have found that pm1  pm2, which is a contradiction with (15), and by this
outcome we have p1  p2 again, such as the Starret’s Theorem predicts. Once
more, we have to conclude saying that the equilibrium which involves the transport
is not possible with free mobility if transport cost exists Α  0.
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2.2 Introducing mobility costs. Two equilibria
The equality of utilities captured by equations (10) and (11) before, are replaced
by equations
1
Λw

w1 ¯h3r1   ¯h3  w1 ¯h3p1 w2 ¯h3r2   ¯h3  w2 ¯h3p2   Λw, Λw  1 (19)
1
Λl

¯l1r1¯l2r2¯hw13
27r1w1p1
¯l1r1¯l2r2¯hw23
27r2w2p2
 Λl , Λl  1 (20)
In our new equilibria differences in utility of both workers and landowners in
sites 1 and 2 are allowed provided those differences are not too big. Only if the
utility at 1 is noticeable bigger than the utility at 2 will an agent decide to change
from 2 to 1. The required difference to do the change is captured by the Λ’s. In the
limit, when Λw  Λl  1, we are back to the free mobility case.
It should be clear that if Λw and Λl are conveniently chosen, equilibriua with
transportation where agents are price takers must exist; If we arbitrarily start from
a distribution of workers and landowners and resolve the system of equations (1)
to (9) we will find an equilibrium where agents in different places have different
utilities. The arbitrarily given distribution will not be an equilibrium distribution if
agents are able to move, but if the Λ are sufficiently big then we can get get as an
equilibrium –conditioned to the selected Λ– almost any arbitrary initial distribution.
The two equilibria we present here are just equilibria with transportation when
prices are taken parametrically by all agents. Those equilibria have been found “af-
ter a little calculation” that we have done with the powerfull help of.
The above examples are equilibria when Λw and Λl are greater respectively that the
ratios of utilities shown in the tables. The way we have made the numeric calcula-
tions does not permit us to say that the equilibrium foun is the only associated to
those Λ’s.
In the tables notice that quantities in “Production and factors demands” are
total quantities for each market, but quantities in ”Demands” sections are individual
quantities (and number of people in each group is normalized to one).
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Table 1: Free and no–free mobility between two sites of equal size.
Common parameter values
Α  0.1 Θ  2/3 w1 ¯l1  1 ¯l2  1 ¯h  1
Free mobility No–Free mobility
Distribution (endogenous) Distribution (exogenous)
Μ  0.5 Γ  0.5 Μ  0.4 Γ  0.4
Equilibrium Prices Equilibrium Prices
w1  1 w2  1 w1  1 w2  0.852
r1  1.5 r2  1.5 r1  1.195 r2  1.534
p1 

6 p2 

6 p1  2.187 p2  2.287
Production and factors demands Production and factors demands
y1  1/ 3

6 y2  1/ 3

6 y1  0.132 y2  0.139
X  0 hx  0 X  0.015 hx  0.002
l1y  1/9 l2y  1/9 l1y  0.120 l2y  0.104
h1y  1/6 h2y  1/6 h1y  0.144 h2y  0.186
Demands Demands
l1w  2/9 l2w  2/9 l1w  0.279 l2w  0.185
h1w  1/3 h2w  1/3 h1w  1/3 h2w  1/3
y1w  1/ 3

6 y2w  1/ 3

6 y1w  0.152 y2w  0.124
l1l  8/9 l2l  8/9 l1l  1.040 l2l  0.778
h1l  4/3 h2l  4/3 h1l  1.243 h2l  1.017
y1l  2

6/9 y2l  2

6/9 y1l  0.568 y2l  0.522
Utilities Utilities
U1w  0.272
U2w  0.272
  U1wU2w  1 U1w  0.383U2w  0.207   U1wU2w  1.848
U1l  0.645
U2l  0.645



 U
1
l
U2l
 1 U
1
l  0.735
U2l  0.569



 U
1
l
U2l
 1.291
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Table 2: Free and no–free mobility between two sites with site 1 bigger (double
size) than 2.
Common parameter values
Α  0.1 Θ  2/3 w1 ¯l1  2 ¯l2  1 ¯h  1
Free mobility No–Free mobility
Distribution (endogenous) Distribution (exogenous)
Μ  0.5 Γ  0.5 Μ  0.6 Γ  0.3
Equilibrium Prices Equilibrium Prices
w1  1 w2  1 w1  1 w2  0.739
r1  1 r2  1 r1  0.731 r2  1.108
p1  2 p2  2 p1  1.710 p2  1.810
Production and factors demands Production and factors demands
y1  2/9 y2  1/9 y1  0.275 y2  0.051
X  0 hx  0 X  0.127 hx  0.013
l1y  2/9 l2y  1/9 l1y  0.321 l2y  0.042
h1y  2/9 h2y  2/9 h1y  0.235 h2y  0.063
Demands Demands
l1w  1/3 l2w  1/3 l1w  0.456 l2w  0.222
h1w  1/3 h2w  1/3 h1w  1/3 h2w  1/3
y1w  1/6 y2w  1/6 y1w  0.195 y2w  0.136
l1l  4/3 l2l  4/3 l1l  1.628 l2l  0.995
h1l  4/3 h2l  4/3 h1l  1.190 h2l  0.815
y1l  2/3 y2l  2/3 y1l  0.696 y2l  0.609
Utilities Utilities
U1w  0.5
U2w  0.5
  U1wU2w  1 U1w  0.800U2w  0.272   U1wU2w  2.940
U1l  1.185
U2l  1.185



 U
1
l
U2l
 1 U
1
l  1.349
U2l  0.905



 U
1
l
U2l
 1.489
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3 Concluding comments
Our example shows that it is possible to have a competitive equilibrium with trans-
portation, when the non-homogeneity of the space, in the form of mobility costs
is introduced. All the authors we have mentioned in this paper we aware of this
possibility and the all have assumed free mobility in their models. An explanation
to do that can be found in Starret (1978): “This [free mobility] assumption is neces-
sary if we are going to discuss first-best welfare issues, since the firstbest problem
involves a free initial choice of location for all agents. Now one may argue that
from a descriptive point of view, much of observed locational configurations are
historical in nature; that is, agents make initial locational choices at some point
of time and then are locked into those choices over time due to the high costs of
moving. There is undoubtedly truth to this position, and we could probably at-
tribute some of the inefficiencies of our presen configuration to historical factors.
However there are always the new location decisions made by “new” agents;these
would consist of new families or firms and intramarginal units who are forced to
move due to transfers, bankrupcies, etc. If there are enough of these marginal and
intramarginal agents, and the market allocated them properly, we might still expect
to achieve a desirable outcome”. We think that costs of mobility together with a
price taking behaviour can be helpful to understand the historical configuration of
the present economic geography.
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